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ABSTRACT 
 
 
EXPLORING EMPATHY REGULATION IN MEDICAL NARRATIVES 
 
By 
 
Adam Uhrig 
 
 
In response to the perceived dehumanizing methods of biomedicine, the humanist 
medical movement of the 1960’s brought with it a demand for the return of empathy to 
clinical practice.  With this demand, the interdisciplinary field known as the medical or 
health humanities sought to bring empathic and humanistic care through the arts and 
literature, with a focus on patient-provider communication.  From this field came 
narrative medicine, a field that looks to facilitate patient-provider communication through 
the inclusion of patient narratives.  However, even with all the support, the 
implementation of empathy into medicine proves to be a complicated endeavor. Empathy, 
a complex emotion that resists definition, can have adverse effects for both patient and 
provider when not applied and regulated correctly.   
There are various strategies involving the regulation of empathy in medicine, 
including distancing, detachment, or emotional numbing.  There is no one standard 
method, and what might work with one patient might not work for another, as with 
providers.  To understand how these various methods and strategies work, I argue that an 
examination of provider narratives can provide insight into how empathy can be properly 
regulated in various situations.  The narratives of health care providers contain themes, 
metaphors, and elements that convey accessible communication about the ways in which 
empathy can be regulated and the benefits of that proper regulation.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
To my mind, empathy is in itself a healing agent. It is one of the most 
potent aspects of therapy, because it releases, it confirms, it brings even 
the most frightened client into the human race. If a person is understood, 
he or she belongs.  
-Carl Rogers “Empathic: An Unappreciated Way of Being” 
 
Since the rise of the humanist medical movement in the late 1960’s, there has 
been an overwhelming demand for the return of empathy to medicine.  This demand 
exists as a backlash against the biomedical model, which involves the blending of science 
and medicine and, it is argued, results in an approach that is “not as humane as it could 
be” (Danini 58).  In response to the understanding that biomedicine favors an approach 
that treats the disease rather than the patient, in recent years, the field known as the 
medical or health humanities has sought to bring empathic and humanistic care through 
the arts and literature, with a strong focus on patient-provider communication.  With this 
focus on communication, the field of narrative medicine was born out of a perceived need 
to “teach doctors [and other care providers]” the “language” necessary to treat the patient 
as well as the disease (Rudnytsky 24).  This “language” would enable empathic, patient-
centered care and “honor the complexities of the self’s relation to the body in which it 
lives” (24).  Through the inclusion of empathy, by way of patient narratives, providers 
would theoretically be able to give a more complete form of care that incorporates the 
patient into the method of healing and medicine. 
However, the implementation of empathy into medicine carries with it various 
complications.  When not taken into consideration, these complications can result in 
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adverse effects for both patient and care provider: poor treatment for the patient and 
burnout for the care provider.  Burnout, a serious condition that can lead to suicide, can 
arise when empathy and emotions are not properly regulated in clinical practice.  Because 
emotions are “generally outside of people’s control,” empathy needs to be broken down 
into components to allow for its implementation into medicine (Halpern 670).  Once 
defined in its components, empathy is believed to be to be more manageable in its 
implementation (that implementation known as “clinical empathy”); however, due to its 
complexity, the strategies of implementation and regulation of empathy can differ greatly 
depending on the provider and the patient being seen.  This thesis explores how a study 
of the narratives of medical professionals has the potential to teach various strategies of 
clinical empathy and promote an understanding of the importance of empathy for both 
patients and care providers.   
 
Biomedicine versus Humanistic Medicine 
The term “biomedicine” was coined during the interwar era and has become the 
“common shorthand” for the collaborative work of doctors and scientists (Lowy 117).  
The “turning point” for the “biomedicalization process,” which “accelerated and 
intensified collaboration between biologists, clinicians, and industrialists,” happened 
some time during World War II, and this collaboration was “exemplified” by the 
“wartime production of penicillin” (Lowy 117).   Furthermore, the advancement of 
biomedicine was made possible by post-war funding for the sake of “medical research” 
and “extension of health insurance to large parts of the population” (Lowy 117).   
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In its science-centered view, biomedicine is perceived to be restricted to a 
calculating world of laboratories, knives, and prescription drugs, unconcerned with the 
humane treatment of patients.  This perception was perpetuated by the “intertwining” of 
laboratory sciences and clinical practices, as well as the “rapid growth of the 
pharmaceutical industry” and the “large-scale production and testing of drugs” (Lowy 
117).  Kathryn Montgomery Hunter, a professor at Feinberg School of Medicine, argues 
that “despite its success, medicine’s identification as a science has had adverse effects,” 
mainly involving a “focus” narrowly confined to the “diagnosis of disease rather than 
attend[ing] to the care of the person who is ill” (Hunter xix).  Additionally, Rita Charon, 
professor of narrative medicine at Columbia University, makes the claim that “the price 
for a technologically sophisticated medicine” is one that renders the “singular and 
meaningful situations” of patients to be ignored by a healthcare “consumed with the 
scientific elements” (Charon 6, 9).   
Due to its science-minded focus and influence on healthcare, biomedicine’s 
perceived inhumane practices have prompted a call for a more human-centered approach, 
an approach involving the application of empathy; this approach came to be known as 
humanistic medicine.  [M]edicine is not a branch of science and it will never be” wrote 
George Sarton, an American chemist and historian: “[i]f medicine is a science, then it is a 
social science” (Sarton 319).  The concern surfaced over biomedicine's focus and 
“interest” on “laboratories” rather than “doctors' surgeries and hospital wards” (Lowy 
122).  Such an observation may seem unnecessarily generalizing, seeing as the practice of 
medicine requires the application of the “scientific method,” but it is argued that it would 
be wrong to think of medicine as an “applied science” because medicine “has an 
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autonomous position” within “our system of learning” (Sarton 319).  According to the 
proponents of humanistic medicine, the dedicated and focused intertwining of the 
laboratory and the clinic is rather unfitting.  A humanistic approach “considers people in 
their intrapersonal, interpersonal, cultural, political, economic, mythic, spiritual and 
historical contexts” (“Guidelines for Humanistic Practice”).  Therefore, it is argued that 
medicine not be “reduced to a science” as it should remain human-centered (Lowy 121).   
The humanistic approach to medicine is concerned with how empathy and a 
patient-centered focus can be brought into healthcare.  It is opposed to a biomedical 
approach, which fosters the “detached concern”1 in which emotions are “neutralized” to 
the point of a healthcare professional “feeling nothing” (Halpern 670).   Juliette Ferry-
Danini, in her essay “A New Path for Humanistic Medicine,” examines “humanistic” as a 
“polysemous” word.  She observes that either the word can refer to a “philosophy that 
centers on humans, their dignity, values, and freedom” or it can refer to “something 
closer to humanitarian or humane,” thereby “designating a concern for human welfare 
and compassion” (Danini 64).  Both definitions represent what some feel is lacking in a 
healthcare system dominated by biomedicine.  To answer the question “What will 
humanize medicine?” Danini draws from several authors to examine the three 
imperatives of a humanistic approach to healthcare.2  The first imperative establishes the 
“importance” of the “emotions of both patients and physicians” in the “role of medicine 
and its practice” (Danini 64).  The second imperative reinforces the first in insisting, 
                                                 
1 The method of “detached concern” is believed to have been pioneered, over a century 
ago, by the Canadian Physician Sir William Osler (1849-1919).   
2 Rita Charon, Havi Carel, James Marcum, Miriam Solomon, Jodi Halpern, and Daniel 
Sulmasy. 
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“patients should not be reduced to their biological bodies but regarded as physical and 
psychological beings” (Danini 64).  Lastly, the third imperative observes that medicine be 
“defined” as a “fundamentally intersubjective practice,” bringing a focus to the patient-
care provider interaction rather than advocating for an approach that encourages 
detachment and dehumanization (Danini 65).  Relying on the establishment of the above 
mentioned imperatives, humanistic medicine advocates for a tone of “mutual respect,” 
“empathy,” and “compassion” between patient and healthcare provider, giving the 
approach a “single framework” with which to “understand medicine: the patient-
[healthcare provider]” interaction and relationship (Danini 65, 66).   
 
Narrative Medicine 
As stated earlier, the demand for a more humane and altruistic approach to 
medicine arose in the late 1960’s; it was the psychologist Carl Rogers who stood as one 
of the first major voices to advocate the importance of empathy in healthcare.  Although 
his writings pertained specifically to the practice of clinical psychotherapy, the way he 
framed the relationship of patient and professional can easily be transferred to other 
healthcare situations.  He observed, “empathy is clearly related to positive outcome” 
(Rogers 8).  Additionally, he reasoned that, as an “active process,” empathy involved 
“reaching out to receive [a patient’s] communication and meaning” and thereby 
“translating” the patient’s narrative into “experienced meaning” (Rogers 4).  This 
“experienced meaning” is the “full, present, and changing awareness of another,” 
“translated” from the psychologist’s “active process of reaching out to receive the 
communication” that could convey those experienced meanings and it is what gives 
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valuable insight to the healthcare professional and is the mutually beneficial goal of being 
present and listening to a patient (Barrett-Lennard).  James Marcum, professor of 
psychology at Baylor University, echoes Rogers’ concern for the “experienced meaning” 
of the patient, further providing evidence of the need for humanistic medicine: 
In contrast to the objective facts and to their logical analysis associated with 
objective, biomedical reasoning, the humanistic or humane models incorporate 
the patient’s narrative of the illness experience into medical practice that uses 
subjective and personal reasoning.  (Marcum 116) 
 
The importance of the patient’s narrative about illness in the practice of medicine brings 
us to one of humanistic medicine’s methods: narrative medicine.   
Bertha Pappenheim, in describing her own psychoanalytical treatment as Anna 
O., coined the term “the talking cure,”3 which refers to the practice of verbal therapy.  
The idea that telling one’s story holds therapeutic potential is central to narrative 
medicine.  The aim of narrative medicine is to bring the lived experiences of patients into 
medicine in order to provide healthcare professionals with a deeper understanding of 
illness.  Therefore, narrative medicine would seek to bring an emphasis to the patient-
provider interaction.  Furthermore, Charon makes the claim that the inclusion of narrative 
medicine would result in “more humane, more ethical, and perhaps more effective care” 
(Charon vii).  Narrative medicine is meant to establish the patient as a “physical and 
psychological being” rather than a petri dish.  Thus, the aim of narrative medicine is to 
help educate the provider on how to be more empathic and provide more humane care. 
For medical students, the usefulness of narrative is presented in two ultimate 
goals: (1) attention: strengthen the attention of the care provider as to access the patient’s 
                                                 
3 Sigmund Freud Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis. Penguin. 1995. 
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situation more accurately and to permit the use of empathy; (2) affiliation: provide the 
patient with the care provider's knowledge, skills, power, and caring, shared through an 
effective patient-professional affiliation (Charon).  Proponents of narrative medicine 
believe that taking time to listen to patients' experiences of illness, in combination with 
the technological advances of biomedicine, results in a more effective form of healthcare 
can be achieved.   
In Arthur Kleinman’s The Illness Narratives (1988), the possibility of a more 
complete healthcare, through the collaboration of biomedicine and humanistic medicine, 
is explored through the author's personal experiences with patients.  When thinking back 
to an elderly patient who had contracted syphilis from a serviceman during World War I, 
Kleinman realized that there existed “two sets of long-term problems” facing this patient 
(Kleinman xii).  The first problem consisted of the “insidious medical complications” 
present from the syphilis; the second was the “life trajectory that her illness had marked 
and inexorably shaped,” or how it had come to shape and define her as a human 
(Kleinman xii).  What appeared striking for Kleinman was that his medical training had 
“systematically educated” him on how to treat the first problem but would lead him to 
“discount” or even “blind” him to the second (Kleinman xii).  If one were to 
acknowledge the existence of these two problems, it should follow that something more 
is required in addition to the “systematically educated” means of biomedicine.  He claims 
that to address the second problem would require the addition of narrative medicine to 
medical curricula, in order to address the “difference between the patient’s experience of 
illness and the doctor’s attention to disease” (Kleinman xii).  For Kleinman, patient 
narratives, and how to listen to them, are what is missing from medical education. 
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The claim made by Charon, Kleinman, Marcum, and others is that through 
expressing empathy and listening to the narratives of patients, healthcare providers are 
able to address an important level of the healing process, one outside the biomedical 
realm of physical symptoms.  Humanistic practices of empathy and narrative medicine 
have been implemented through the inter- and multi-disciplinary scholarly field known as 
the medical or health humanities.  The University of Oxford defines the medical 
humanities as a “richly diverse field of scholarship” that “draws on disciplines in the 
humanities, social sciences, and the arts.”  For the purpose of “providing insights into one 
of the most basic and universal of human concerns, these disciplines can inform the 
science and practice of medicine” (Oxford). The medical humanities enable inter and 
multidisciplinary research (cultural and literary) to take place between medicine and the 
social sciences for the purpose of furthering medical education and practice.  The 
literature and philosophy of medical humanities could be seen as being comprised of the 
soft sciences to the hard sciences and thereby serving as a complement to biomedicine’s 
world of medications and surgical instruments.  The late K. Danner Clouser, in a 1980 
keynote speech at a health education conference, spoke of the void in medical training 
that the humanities can fill: 
What’s missing in a vocational training? […] It leaves out everything that makes 
us uniquely human.  Where do we train for understanding, suffering, and joy?  
Where do we gain ideas and models – for motivations, for patterning out lives, for 
fashioning out goals, emotions, attitudes, and character?  […] Where do we gain 
perspective on our own life, on others’, and the relationships between them?  
These things don’t just happen, however much we like to believe they do.  
(Clouser) 
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For Clouser, the humanities can supply what is missing from medical education.  His 
claim relies on the premise that, by way of its integration into education, the humanities 
can teach empathy and other humanistic values.   
 
Empathy Regulation 
Since the rise of the medical humanities, training models have been developed 
with the intent to bring empathy to the core of medicine.  Models such as mandatory 
courses, goal setting, and lecture have been among the most common methods of 
education (Aggarwal).  Empathy training and assessment have become not only part of 
early medical training, but also a consistent topic within medical literature, and is the 
subject of numerous medical conferences.  Notably, the introduction of empathy training 
raises some complicated issues, mainly pertaining to the definition of empathy and how 
exactly should it be implemented.4  
Subject to “complex, multifaceted definitions”, there is “considerable 
disagreement” over how empathy should be defined (Shapiro 276).  If empathy is 
difficult to define, how can it be properly implemented into medicine?  It is not that 
empathy lacks a definition.  On the contrary, it has many definitions that seek to bring 
precise language to something intuitive and yet difficult to define.  For the purpose of this 
research, I will refer to the vernacular definition of empathy as the experience of 
understanding and relating to another’s state of emotion from his or her perspective.  
Interestingly enough, such an ability to “adopt the perspective of another” is thought to 
                                                 
4 For more on the complex nature of empathy, especially as it pertains to medicine, see 
“What's it all about, empathy?” from Nurse Education Today, Volume 17, Issue 2, April 
1997, pages 106-110. 
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be “unique” to humans (Decety 338).  Because empathy is associated with and promotes 
prosocial behaviors (voluntary actions intended to help or benefit another),5 it is thought 
to be a desired trait for those working in medicine.  However, when systematically 
applied within the practice of medicine, where precise language matters, empathy must 
be broken down into components to better understand and examine its process. 
Janice M. Morse, a professor of nursing at the University of Utah, has made the 
claim that there are four components of empathy.6  Drawing from clinical psychology, 
she defines these components as behavioral, cognitive, emotive, and moral.  The 
behavioral component is the communicative response with which one conveys 
understanding of another’s perspective.  This component involves the ability for a care 
provider to demonstrate effectively to patients that their suffering is understood.  
Empathic understanding is conveyed through body language, tone of voice, choice of 
words, and so on.  An understanding is communicated without having to be spelled out.  
An example of behavioral empathy would be a doctor “touching a shoulder or knee” of a 
distressed patient (Shapiro 278).  Additionally, the “manifestations” of this component of 
empathy are capable of being “observed and evaluated” through scientific means (Morse 
275).   
The emotive component of empathy is the ability to subjectively experience and 
share in another’s psychological state, emotions, or intrinsic feelings.  Because of the 
nature of emotional distress, this component is seen as the contagious aspect of empathy, 
                                                 
5 Batson and Shaw, 1991; Davis, 1983; Penner, et al, 2005; Decety and Hodges, 2006; 
Decety and Lamm, 2006; Wiseman, 2007. 
6 From the Journal of Nursing Scholarship vol. 24, no. 4, Winter 1992.  Although this 
analysis is nearly 17 years old, its findings are still relevant as scholars within the field of 
medicine are still citing it within the on-going debate of empathy.   
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or an “emotional contagion.”  An emotional contagion is “a person’s emotional response 
while observing another person’s actual or anticipated condition” (Gladstein 471).  An 
example would be if one were to observe someone’s grief, embarrassment, or joy and 
then feel that very same emotion.  It is natural to mirror and experience the emotions of 
another.  Such mirroring can make empathy dangerous in a clinical setting; however, 
when exposed to the suffering of others on a daily basis, without the skill to distance 
oneself, compassion fatigue becomes a serious concern (Hunt 8).  In recognizing this 
emotional response, a provider is “motivated” to either “engage in cognitive and 
behavioral empathy” or to take the alternative and “distance him- or herself from the 
distress of another” (Morse 275).  
The moral component of empathy is the “internal, altruistic force that motivates 
the practice of empathy.”  The inclusion of this component can be rather subjective and 
debatable as this aspect of empathy has not been “clearly delineated or defined” as its 
own “separate component” from the others (Morse 273).  It is possible to attribute this  to 
the already subjective nature of empathy and the debate as to whether or not there is a 
relationship between empathy and morality.7  The link between empathy and morality is a 
complicated one as “empathy is not always a direct avenue to moral behavior” 
considering that empathy can “introduce partiality” (Decety 337).  The moral component 
is “rooted in the philosophical belief” that we as a species “share common needs,” 
“experience the same human condition,” and are all “interconnected and interrelated” 
(Morse 274).  Piaget believed that infants were born with the “raw materials” of 
                                                 
7 See Jean Decety and Jason Cowell’s “The complex relationship between morality and 
empathy,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, July 2014, Vol. 18, No. 7. 
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“sympathetic tendencies” and “affective reactions” that later developed into moral 
behavior (Gradstein 475).  Therefore, this component of empathy could be seen as the 
reason many decide to go into the field of medicine as a form of altruistic motivation, it is 
that “natural willingness” to “help other people who are distressed or who need 
assistance” (Morse 274-275.   
The cognitive component of empathy is the intellectual ability to identify and 
understand another person’s feelings and perspective intellectually.  This component is 
also identified as “clinical empathy” (which will be explored later in this introduction) as 
it is a process of identification as to “whose emotions belong to whom during empathic 
engagement” (Hunt 9).  It is a “teachable” skill that is “built on natural abilities” (Morse 
274).  Some emotional distance from patient suffering is required for this component but 
that distance must come from the ability to “comprehend, reason, analyze, and think 
critically” about the patient or medical scenario (Morse 275).  The successful use of the 
cognitive component is “distinguished” by way of its use of “subjective” and 
“experiential input” for clinical interactions (Halpern 671).  The objective of this 
component is in being able to create and establish that safe distance, thereby making 
compassion fatigue and burnout become less of a concern.   
The purpose of emotional regulation is that it serves as a means to “free up 
cognitive resources” and allow healthcare professionals “to do their jobs better” (Carey).8  
To be more specific, a “well-developed ability” to “self-regulate emotions” will “reduce 
the risks of burnout” for healthcare professionals (Hunt 19).  Empathy in medicine can be 
                                                 
8 For further detail on the study, see Jean Decety’s review “The Neurodevelopment of 
Empathy in Humans,” Dev Neuroscience, 2010, 32:257-267. 
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seen as a fine line: too much and a provider risks becoming overwhelmed and drained, 
not enough and the act of caring for patients becomes mechanical and loses all meaning.  
Both scenarios can result in burnout or compassion fatigue.  Burnout is a serious issue for 
those who work in medicine as it can cause depression and can even result in suicide.  
The American Foundation for Suicide Prevention reports that about 23% of interns had 
suicidal thoughts and an estimated 300-400 physicians die, per year, from suicide in the 
U.S. (AFSP).  It is not just the ability to “do” one’s job “better” and “free up cognitive 
resources,” but by regulating emotional responses, providers can avoid the serious risks 
of depression and suicide.   
Psychologist Herbert Freudenberger originally coined the term “burnout” in the 
early 1970’s to describe the “consequences of severe stress” resulting from “high ideals 
in ‘helping’ professions,” specifically in the field of medicine (Cologne).  Since then, the 
symptoms of burnout have increased in range as more symptoms are recognized, making 
the symptoms difficult to distinguish from those of anxiety, depression, and secondary 
traumatic stress, thereby making burnout more complex and more difficult to pin down 
with an exact definition.  Although there is a wide range of symptoms, three main 
symptoms have largely been agreed upon: (1) exhaustion: an emotional fatigue 
characterized by inability to cope and lack of energy; (2) alienation: a feeling of 
increasing cynicism and frustration towards work and colleagues, characterized by 
emotional distancing and numbness; and (3) reduced performance: an overall negative 
attitude about work, characterized by an inability to concentrate, a listlessness, and a lack 
of innovation (PubMed Health).  Often times, in literature about burnout within medicine, 
the symptoms of emotional exhaustion or “compassion fatigue” will mingle with those of 
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burnout.  Compassion fatigue is the result of becoming “emotionally drained” by way of 
“caring too much” and becoming “adversely affected by our efforts” (Figley 7).  Much 
like with burnout, it can be a consequence of being “emotionally vulnerable” (Figley 7).  
As stated earlier, burnout and compassion fatigue are a serious concern for healthcare 
professionals due to the high-stress environments they work in; in order to avoid the risks 
of these ailments, healthcare professionals need to regulate their emotions to avoid 
leaving themselves vulnerable. 
The process by which empathy is regulated is primarily referred to as “clinical 
empathy.”  Clinical empathy involves “cognitive empathy,” the application of “emotional 
attunement to serve the cognitive goal of understanding the emotions of the patient” 
(Lakhani).  Clinical empathy involves some distancing or detachment; it is an “act of 
correctly acknowledging the emotional state of another without experiencing that state 
oneself” (Halpern 670).  It is a “skill” that is “developed through practice using one’s 
natural empathic capacity” (Alligood).  In other words, it does not just come naturally but 
requires “practice,” as providers seek to offer humanistic care while protecting 
themselves from burnout and compassion fatigue. 
Existing data from studies in psychology and medicine point to the overwhelming 
benefits of properly regulated empathy, for both healthcare professional and patient.  For 
patients, these include shorter recovery times and healthier outcomes.9  For healthcare 
                                                 
9 For more information on the quantitative details of how empathy affects patient health, 
see Christine Thompson’s “Uncovering the Patient Experieince: Empathy Mapping 
Promotes Patient-Centered Care for Improved Heart Failure Patient Outcomes,” Journal 
of Cardiac Failure, volume 22, issue 8, August 2016, pages S87-S88.  As well as Joanne 
Olson’s “Nurse-Expressed Empathy, Patient Outcomes, and Development of a Middle-
Range Theory,” Journal of Nursing Scholarship, March 1997. 
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professionals, there is an added occupational understanding and a reduced risk of clinical 
burnout and compassion fatigue,10 but this is only if empathy is being properly regulated.  
As Gerald Gladstein, a professor of education from the University of Rochester, points 
out, empathy “does not necessarily lead to helping behaviors” (Gladstein 477).  Referring 
to “emotional or affective” empathy, or what Morse defines as the “emotive” component, 
he explains that this form of empathy can act as a “contagion” and “affect the observer,” 
causing an “overreaction” and “empathic distress” that has the potential to “lead [the 
observer] away from helping” (477).  He goes on to point out Roger’s cautioning that 
“there must be an appropriate amount” of empathy and Stewart’s argument that a 
“deliberate distancing must occur after emotional involvement” (477).  I argue that 
empathy can be thought of as a medication, but unlike most medications, empathy affects 
both patient and provider in its dosage and side effects.  However, there is no 
pharmacology for this medication; there is no recognized textbook that can provide 
guidance in its administration.  It is something that must be experimented with and 
practiced on.   
Currently, the clinical education in empathy, with its “plethora of words expended 
in support” of its training, “has not successfully translated into sustainable and effective 
attitudes and actions” in healthcare professionals (Shapiro 276).  The demand for a return 
of empathy to medicine is a strong one, but how exactly empathy can fit safely and 
effectively into the clinic is still up for debate.  Although the humanities are often touted 
                                                 
10 Patricia A. Hunt’s (et al.) “Burnout and its Relationship to Empathy in Nursing: a 
review of the literature” and Jodi Halpern’s “What is Clinical Empathy?” discuss how 
well-regulated emotions can lead to more meaningful and satisfying occupational lives 
within medicine. 
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as a solution for a lack of empathy in medicine, there is some debate over their ability to 
foster empathy effectively.  In her book Literature and Medicine: A Claim for a 
Discipline (1984), Anne Hudson Jones voices her concern over the expectation that 
studying the humanities will foster humanistic approaches and make one more humane.  
She states that the “expectation” makes her “very uncomfortable” as such an “expectation 
is a burden, not just for literature, but for all of the humanities,” going on to point out that 
although she, and many others, would “hope” that the humanities would make one more 
humanistic, she has seen “too many examples of the contrary” in order to “believe in any 
guarantee” (Jones 32).11  It would seem as though either maybe something is missing 
from empathy education or the training of such is far more complex than it is given 
credit.12 
This, I would argue, is where the idea of narrative medicine comes in.  If 
narratives are the means by which the lived experiences of illness are conveyed, then it 
should hold true that the narratives of healthcare professionals are the means by which 
                                                 
11 For a more contemporary take on the limits of empathy training, see Paul Bloom's 
book Against Empathy: The Case For Rational Compassion (2018).  Bloom argues that 
for those healthcare providers who go through empathy training, the “negative affect was 
increased in response to both people in distress and even to people in everyday life 
situations” which suggests an unnecessary compounding in “distress” for both patient and 
provider, brought on by empathy training.   
12 It could be argued that the “practice of empathy” is complicated, and the degree of 
application of clinical empathy will greatly depend on the provider’s occupation, 
personality, and history, or simply put “life experiences.”  Perhaps the reason for the lack 
of success is that there is no one correct method of empathy regulation for everyone.  
Such a hypothesis is not ungrounded, given what has been previously discussed in 
regards to definitional complexities pertaining to empathy, burnout, and the role of 
education in perspective taking. I would argue that the complexities exist on an 
individualistic basis, meaning that the method and degree by which empathy is regulated 
varies greatly from person to person and from occupation to occupation.  In other words, 
it could be argued that clinical empathy, like medicine, should be viewed and examined 
as a process akin to “an art (as opposed to, and addition to, a science)” (Danini 61). 
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the regulation of empathy is conveyed.  The documented experiences of doctors and 
nurses should provide insight into strategic degrees of emotional engagement and 
disengagement.  Provider narratives could yield methods on empathy regulation and thus 
methods to avoid burnout.   Furthermore, these self-reflective accounts are a form of 
medical narrative practice, as they provide validation and insight to the personal 
experiences of healthcare professionals by revealing the various dimensions of healing as 
expressed by Kleinman. 
If the lived experiences of healthcare professionals are examined through 
Charon’s goals for narrative medicine, attention and affiliation, then it should be possible 
for readers of these narratives to gain a situational awareness of the development and 
practice of emotional regulation.  Because narratives can convey the varied emotions, 
experiences, and histories each professional brings with them, these personal histories 
have the potential to convey how the process of empathy is regulated and how stress and 
trauma are internalized.  Therefore, it should be acknowledged that the narratives of 
healthcare providers convey the various methods in which each occupation and each 
individual works to regulate empathy in an attempt to stave off burnout.  It is the purpose 
of this review to analyze the narratives of doctors and nurses in an attempt to understand 
and interpret various methods of clinical empathy and identify the practices by which 
empathy is regulated and burnout is avoided. 
In order to examine the self-reflective modes and methods of empathy regulation, 
the contemporary accounts of doctors and nurses are presented here as works of medical 
narrative.  The narratives are chosen for their deep level of self-reflection and for their 
range in strategies of empathy regulation.  In order to use the most relevant concepts and 
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terms, these narratives are examined using commentary from scholars from the fields of 
humanistic psychology and medicine, psychoanalysis, and the medical humanities.  
Humanistic approaches to psychology and psychoanalysis best provide the framework 
from which to understand the components of empathy and their process as well as the 
effects and causes of burnout as they are described by the texts in my archive.   
 
Chapter Summary 
The narratives chosen for this project offer various strategies and methods evident 
in not only their self-reflective content, but also in their narrative form and framework.  
The first chapter explores narratives by doctors.  Dr. Frank Huyler's prose poems, which 
detail life in the emergency room, and Dr. Danielle Ofri's reflective and analytic essays, 
about the emotional aspect of medicine as it applies to trainees and practicing physicians.  
Both works are examined in relation to the dehumanization of both patient and provider 
that can result from an expectation of complete empathic distancing.  The distancing 
allows for objectification, which takes the place of the meaningful and humanistic 
encounters that are missing in the patient/provider relationship.  How emotional 
expectations placed upon doctors can affect everyday interactions with patients is 
examined in the context of narrative and empathy regulation.   
The second chapter explores narratives by nurses.  Narratives from Kimberly 
Condon, Janice Hudson, and Laura DeVaney detail experiences from a range of positions 
from the emergency room, hospice, post-surgery, and emergency flight nursing.  
DeVaney's narrative is a self-reflective account detailing empathy regulation in a post-
surgery cancer ward.  Hudson provides the experiences of an emergency flight nurse, a 
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first responder on the front lines of medicine.  Lastly, Condon an empathic ER nurse who 
turns to hospice work, examines her own struggles with having to distance herself 
emotionally from patients.  This chapter's self-reflections on empathy regulation address 
empathy as an emotional contagion, as noted by Gladstein.  Autonomy and 
hyperindividualism become subjects of concern in the process of these nurses building 
their own immune system against the contagious effects of empathy.13  
Taken together, this study of these narratives will show that there are elements 
and themes present that can provide useful information and insight into the complicated 
process of empathy regulation.  Furthermore, this study will show that it is narrative 
writing that allows for the communication of strategies of the empathic process and the 
complexities that surround it.  
                                                 
13 Though it is true that nursing is dominated by women and it could be argued that 
women are expected to be more empathic, an analysis on such is outside the scope of my 
research.  For more on this subject, see Leonardo Christov-Moore's “Empathy: Gender 
effects in brain and behavior,” Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, Vol. 46, Part 4, 
Pages 604-627, 2014. 
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DOCTORS 
 
The old-timers used to tell me that the longer you work this job the longer your 
stethoscope.  I wore the longest on the market, and still I could hear, under the 
pulse, the heart’s fortune-telling wail.  Through the bubbling air in the fluid-
choked chest, a terrible silence.  No instrument can block that.   
—Joseph Connelly, Bringing Out the Dead, pg. 87 
 
In the winter of 2017, the bizarre details of a trial involving a surgeon who carved 
his initials into the transplanted livers of his patients appeared all over news outlets.  The 
surgeon, Dr. Simon Bramhall, “admitted two counts of assault by beating” in relation to 
using an “argon beam” to burn “SB” onto the livers of two patients (Perraudin).  It was 
determined by the court that both incidents required “skill and concentration” and were 
performed “in the presence of colleagues” (Perraudin).  This alarming case prompted 
many to recount a similar incident in 2000 when a Dr. Allan Zarkin carved the initials 
“AZ” into the abdomen of his patient, after performing a Caesarean section, leaving the 
patient feeling, in her own words, like a “branded animal” (Wongjan).  Neither of the 
doctors personally offered any public explanation for their actions, leaving their motives 
to speculation.  However, in an opinion article written in The Guardian, Dr. Henry 
Marsh, a surgeon and published author, attempts to offer an explanation involving 
emotional distancing and empathy.   
In an effort to shed light on the reasoning behind such disturbing actions, Marsh 
claims that he and other doctors “walk a tightrope between compassion and detachment” 
(Marsh).  The metaphor of the “tightrope” illustrates the alleged danger of doctors 
becoming “disinhibited” in their work (Marsh).  Additionally, the metaphor offers some 
insight into the level of danger and skill that is involved when treading carefully around 
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empathy and emotion in medicine; one misstep could be costly.  Marsh's notion of 
doctors walking a tightrope alludes to how cognitive empathy works by comparing the 
regulation of one’s emotional responses to the skillful and difficult act of balancing on a 
rope suspended dangerously high in the air.  However, Marsh goes on to advocate for a 
completely “detached” approach, free from empathy, when dealing with patients, making 
the claim that “empathy is the last thing [doctors] want” (Marsh).  His claim is that when 
a doctor falls off the “tightrope,” he or she runs the risk of “disinhibited” actions, such as 
leaving a “brand” on a patient, an action that Marsh calls “silly,” but not “criminal.”  It 
could be that Marsh does not subscribe to the idea that empathy can be regulated as he 
advocates for a mode of disconnection by being “as emotionally detached as possible 
from the patient” (Marsh).  Such an emphasis on emotional distancing is an approach 
known as “detached concern.” 
Canadian physician Sir William Osler, often described as the “father of modern 
medicine,” helped to cultivate the detached approaches that later become associated with 
biomedicine (Ofri 3).  In a speech to the graduating medical students of the University of 
Pennsylvania, in 1889, Osler underscored the dangers of sensitivity and empathy, stating, 
“A certain measure of insensibility is not only an advantage, but a positive necessity in 
the exercise of a calm judgment” (Ofri 4).  In place of empathy, he argued for a 
“neutralizing” of emotions to the point that physicians “felt nothing in response to 
suffering,” thereby allowing them to “study” and “see into” the “inner life” of the patient 
(Halpern 670).  Theoretically, by stripping humanistic traits and elements from the 
practice of medicine, a physician would separate himself or herself from the patient for 
the purpose of efficient observation.  For Marsh, “experiencing emotion” is 
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“unimportant” in “understanding what a patient is feeling” (Halpern 670).  The model of 
detached concern “presupposes that knowing how a patient feels is no different from 
knowing that the patient is in a certain emotional state” (Halpern 670).  Such a position 
assumes that the inclusion of any such emotional process to be a “threat to objectivity” 
and that “experiencing emotion” is deemed to be “unimportant for understanding” the 
patient (Halpern 670, 671).  
The emotionless, disconnected doctor may sound like a very familiar stereotype, 
one possibly found in novels, film, or other mediums of entertainment.  Such a trope 
could best be referred to as the “television doctor”14.  Characteristically, the television 
doctor will remain “detached from patients” and from empathy, while being praised as a 
paragon of “technological and diagnostic acumen.” Entertainment media presents these 
cold and calculating doctors as heroes and heroines of western medicine (Ofri 4).  
Characters like Dr. Cox from Scrubs (2001-2010), Dr. House of House (2004-2012), and 
Dr. Casey of Ben Casey (1961-1966) are all lauded for their biting and bitter sarcasm and 
clean-cut efficiency and exist as fictional characters of detached concern’s success 
applied to everyday clinical scenarios.  The television doctor is detached concern 
manifest into a persona, or extrinsic self.  Dr. Danielle Ofri, a practicing physician and 
professor of medicine at New York University of Medicine, in her reflective, personal 
essays, offers insight into the mentality that encourages many doctors to adopt this 
persona that has become a popular staple in media: 
Nobody was interested in hearing from doctors who were having doubts, who 
were overwhelmed, who were unraveling.  “Suck it up” was the modus operandi.  
                                                 
14  The distant “television doctor” persona can be seen as an extrinsic self, or constructed 
personality, that has two purposes in this case: to keep the patient’s emotions at a distance and to 
keep the physician distant from his or her own emotions.   
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Real doctors were supposed to be immune to this sticky side of medicine or, at the 
very least, able to handle it discreetly, covertly, alone.  (Ofri 167)   
 
The use of the label “real doctors” is alarming as it shows that doctors who have not 
neutralized their emotions are not even to be considered part of the clinical practice 
simply based on their inability to neutralize their emotions.  Additionally, the demand for 
stoicism goes further to include the doctor’s own fears and doubts, locking down not only 
the processing of patients’ concerns, but also the doctor’s.  Doctors are meant to be some 
form of omnipotent being, one “immune” to the emotional responses of patients and all-
knowing in their observations.  Has society been under the model of biomedicine and 
scientific management for so long that the normalization of detached concern as made the 
idea of a doctor with emotions that unsettling?  The detached television doctor paints an 
attractive but unrealistic ideal for physicians who would attempt to avoid emotions and 
empathy and for those who would expect it.  The typical fictional doctors display an 
unwavering control over their emotions that allows for the control of both the patient’s 
anatomy and their own psychological state.  The current health care system seems to have 
established this “modus operandi” of efficient, stoic, detachment that runs so deep that 
doctors are expected to be emotionally numb in nearly all aspects of their life.  There are 
dangers in certain approaches to medicine, and an all-or-nothing approach to empathy is 
one of them: 
[L]ack of investment can lead to rote medical care—impersonal at best, shoddy at 
worst.  At the other end of the spectrum is the doctor who is inundated with grief 
and can’t function because of the overwhelming sorrow.  Burnout is a significant 
risk in both of these cases, and that erodes the quality of medical care.  (Ofri 121) 
 
Here Ofri provides further insight into why proper empathy regulation is important.  Her 
reflection could be applied to the “tightrope” analogy referred to earlier; however, Ofri 
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offers a more accessible and defined representation of empathy and detachment in 
medicine.  The doctor who stands a better chance against burnout and disinhibited actions 
places him or herself between the two extremes, finding a personal balance and 
regulating his or her emotional process, the use of clinical empathy.  However, even for 
those doctors who have found a balance with empathy and wish to be more engaged with 
their patients, the current system of efficiency seems to place restrictions on a doctor’s 
involvement with a patient’s needs:   
Sure, it’s wonderful to have an in-depth conversation with a patient, to do a more 
thorough physical exam, to patiently explain the disease process to a family 
member, to read up on a rare disorder, to attend that lecture on communication 
skills, to visit a patient a third time in the day, to make those extra phone calls to 
unravel a patient’s medical history, to let a patient ramble on without 
interruption—but none of these things will get the work done.  The scut list will 
still be there. (Ofri 34-35)  
 
Recognizing the need for workload balance, Ofri points out the multitude of beneficial 
steps that would, on one hand, greatly improve health care, but on the other hand, serve to 
overload an already overwhelmed doctor:  As expressed by Ofri, in giving a patient ideal 
care, there is the potential for a great deal of extra work and it is only natural that many 
doctors can develop burnout from the pressure of the overwhelming expectations of both 
the system and patients. 
 However, the alternative could reasonably be seen as dehumanizing, as it makes 
the patient out to be an object rather than a human.  Moreover, the method seems to 
attempt to make doctors out to be analytical machines rather than everyday people with 
emotions.  Referring back to Marsh's analogy of the tightrope, given an understanding of 
detached concern and the numbing of empathy, could it not be said that it is the 
application of disconnection rather than the application of empathy that causes doctors to 
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“treat patients as objects” and thereby enabling doctors to sign or “brand” their work, 
effectively dehumanizing the practice of medicine?  True, empathy, when unregulated, 
can prove to be dangerous for providers, but it is doubtful that it is compassion and an 
empathic connection that enables the disconnect necessary to view patients as objects or 
animals.  Would it not be more reasonable to argue that while doctors do walk a 
tightrope, it is not only unchecked empathy that causes them to slip off but also the 
complete lack thereof? 
What is to be observed in these examples of dehumanization and branding is that 
the desire to leave one’s mark seems to exist as a form of “objectification” which could 
be seen as a consequence brought on by detached concern’s “neutralizing” of emotions.  
It could be argued that if “calm judgment” and “efficiency” are the focus for these modes 
of dehumanizing detachment, then the patient is in danger of becoming an object or 
product to be signed off on and the doctor a machine working far removed from human 
emotion.  Sociologist, philosopher, and critic, Georg Simmel15 defines “objectification” 
as the “means by which people take possession of the world around them in words, 
works, organizations, and tradition” (Timmermans 22).  Additionally, the sociologists 
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann16 see it as a “dialectic process” by which one 
“internalizes meaning” and “expresses” that meaning in ways “accessible to others,” 
making objectification an “ability to recognize human products as elements of a common 
world” (Timmermans 22).  This process becomes a form of communication between the 
                                                 
15 Simmel, Georg.  The Philosophy of Money.  Routledge.  1990. 
16 Berger, Peter L., Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in 
the Sociology of Knowledge. Anchor Book. 1966. 
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“common world” and the individual as the individual attempts to make accessible and 
“express” meaning.  The surgeon's initials can be seen as a form of this communication. 
The television doctor as an extrinsic self may not be as obvious a form of objectification 
as branding a liver, but it can still exist as a means by which doctors can attempt to “take 
possession of the world around them” through a “tradition.” Taking the practice of 
medicine and associating it with the tropes popular in media would allow for an 
“expression of meaning” to the “common world” in a way that is highly “accessible to 
others.”  Even if the adoption of the television doctor persona does not present itself as an 
overly alarming action, like that of branding a patient, it still brings with it all the 
associated issues detached concern presents.  Through the use of this persona, doctors 
will be expected to condition themselves as machines of efficiency and view patients as 
product or objects of study.   
  If one is to accept that doctors are to condition themselves devoid of emotion 
and operate as efficient machines, then it might follow that such conditions would render 
the practice of medicine removed and distant from the humanistic act it should be.  It 
would seem that the dehumanizing aspect of objectification takes place when the 
provider’s work and ability to empathize with patients is “neutralized,” which then, in 
turn, results in a neutralizing of the patient’s “agency” by observing them as something 
less-than-human, resulting in an “erasure of authenticity, an alienation of identities and a 
silencing or even displacement of the self and the social world” (Timmermans 22).  Such 
is the case for those patients who, when signed with their doctor’s initials, felt like a 
“branded animal.”  In the case of the two surgeons, a paradox happens: by signing their 
work, an effort is made to connect their labor and identities, to the world around them, as 
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desperately human; however, in that dehumanizing act of burning their initials into the 
patient, the patients' autonomy is damaged, making them less than human.  The act of 
branding their patients could be examined in two ways: the provider’s initials could be an 
attempt to “make meaning” of their work or it could be an attempt to “take possession” of 
the clinical act they are engaged in.  Either way, due to the objectification suffered by the 
patients, they suffer dehumanization twice over: once as a result of the initial application 
of detached concern and a second time to satisfy a need to bring a humanistic element 
when there was none.   
The issue of objectifying and marking patients in the medical context can be 
compared to what goes on in factories and on assembly lines where workers are 
encouraged to operate as machines.  Consider the narrative experiences of a steel mill 
laborer from Studs Terkel’s famous book Working: People Talk About What They Do All 
Day and How They Feel About What They Do (1979).  The narrative of a steel mill 
laborer named Mike LeFevre begins the collection; his experiences stress the importance 
of worker-recognition in conditions that foster disconnect, dehumanization, and 
efficiency.  “It’s hard to take pride in a bridge you’re never gonna cross” or “in a door 
you’re never gonna open” for, as LeFevre points out, if “[y]ou’re mass-producing things 
and you never see the end result of it” then there is no “pride” to be had in one’s work 
(Terkel xxxi).  LeFevre sees his tasks as anonymous and, as such, finds it difficult to 
“internalize meaning” in his work.  His readily accessible response to the disconnect from 
his work is to have some form of recognition established, whether that be a plaque, a 
memorial, or a signature.  Such a “readily accessible” method to show that a human, 
someone with a name and “agency,” was behind this product and that someone gave 
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laborious time and effort into its construction.  He confesses to occasionally putting a 
“dent” in his work, making the product “unique” so that, among the routinized element of 
mass-production, he knows that one part stands out as his own, having left his “brand” on 
it (Terkel xxxviii).  Denting one of the parts he is working on is his form of meaning-
making, a form of which is much less severe than carving initials into a patient, but 
perhaps carries with it the same reasoning.  In order to show pride and give his work a 
“recognizable human element,” he creates a product that is uniquely flawed and thus 
apart from the rest.  One could also view the “dent” as anonymous signature, one that 
won't lead his foreman directly to him.  He likens his “disinhibited” compulsion of his to 
the existential crisis in Ernest Hemingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls (1940), in which 
the protagonist looks to an unborn child as the only hope for his continued existence; “if 
you die, I die” he says to the pregnant mother (Terkel xxxviii).  Because of the 
dehumanization and disconnect to which he is subjected, without that verifying “brand” 
his work and, by extension, his existence become purposeless.   
The dehumanizing distancing laborers like LeFevre feel between themselves and 
their work is the result of an industrial method based on the “principles of scientific 
management,” which, it would seem, has also left its mark on medicine.  Since its 
publication in 1911, Frederick Taylor’s Principles of Scientific Management has had a 
significant influence on Western industries.  Conceived as a process by which managers 
could increase the productivity of their laborers through worker conditioning and 
micromanagement, the principles— formulated by Taylor, an American mechanical 
engineer— have since spread outside the repetitive assembly lines of factories into nearly 
all sectors of the Western workplace.  Through the implementation of “systematic 
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observation” for the “standardization” of human behavior, Taylor boasted of his ability to 
improve the common worker’s efficiency and product output (Ewen 80).  His methods 
required that the ideal worker be viewed and treated as a “pliable instrument” and 
“automaton” performing functions with “routinized elements” (Ewen 80).  The worker 
would be effectively dehumanized and reduced to the status of a machine.  Taylor’s 
mental conditioning of a worker involved the “systematic stripping” of traits and aspects 
that had previously relied on the “judgment and discretion” of skilled workers, removing 
the capacity for reason and discretion and making their actions automative (Ewen 80). 
  This system of management reduces, or rather “simplifies,” the worker’s tasks 
into a string of automated procedures, thus severing the connection between a “worker’s 
mind and hand” (Ewen 80).  The worker, stripped of humanity, becomes the ideal 
“instrument” of efficiency.  Within the push for that “highest state of efficiency,” the 
worker and the product and its production become meaningless outside of the desired 
run-time quantity, or how much product can be pushed through in a shift (Ewen 81).  For 
the sake of productivity, workers are pushed to their very limits and are overworked,17 
creating work environments that foster conditions for burnout.  
                                                 
17 Being overworked is a serious concern for many doctors.  Many feel as though they are 
“burning a candle at both ends.” It was found in a survey that 81% of U.S. doctors feel as 
though they work at either full capacity or are overworked (PMDS).  The survey was 
conducted by a nonprofit organization, “aimed at advancing the work of practice 
physicians,” to examine the results of being overworked, including the alarming and 
“steady rise” in “emotional exhaustion” and “detachment from patients,” contrasted by 
the “plummeting levels” of “self-accomplishment” doctors experience (PMDS).  Through 
the influence of detached concern, compounded by overwork, there is a disconnect 
between doctor and patient.  As a result of this disconnect, many doctors run the risk of 
“treat[ing] patients more like objects rather than people” (PMDS).   
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When a system of labor strips away a worker’s humanity, for the purpose of 
creating a purely objective and “pliable instrument,” there seems to be a strong desire, or 
drive, on the part of the worker to “take possession” and create meaning in their labor.  In 
the cases previously mentioned, the worker seeks to make the product of their labor 
“recognizably human” in a backlash against the “erasure of authenticity” and “alienation” 
brought on by the principles of biomedicine and scientific management.  As highly 
unethical as it is for a doctor to engage in the disinhibited act of burning his or her initials 
into a patient, this act seems to be a mirroring of LeFevre’s need to “stand out” and show 
that a human, imperfect and real, was behind the work.   
Dr. Frank Huyler’s collection of autobiographical prose poems, The Blood of 
Strangers (1999), addresses this need among physicians in rich detail.  Huyler’s 
collection offers unapologetic accounts of struggles with empathy within clinical 
practice, as well as the erosion of meaning and humanity in medicine.  In the ER, some 
patients come in requiring a substantial amount of care before they are sent home or to 
another area of the hospital.  Providers need to act quickly and do a great deal within a 
small window of time.  A patient may come in unconscious and in need of life-saving 
treatment but later leave without ever having known the team that saved him or her.  Or, 
worse, an abusive patient may take advantage of the ER staff’s care, trivializing it.  In 
such an environment, doctors need to make some meaning of their work. This is where 
narrative comes in.  As to be observed in the examples to come, narrative has the 
potential to serve as a vessel for meaning-making.  Through the act of narrative writing, 
doctors have the ability to construct meaning from the everyday clinical interactions and 
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satisfying the need to connect one's labor to the common world in a way that is accessible 
to others. 
In a chapter titled “Needle,” Huyler conveys the discussed desire to objectify and 
to take ownership of his work.  Whereas the two surgeons discussed at the beginning of 
this chapter took this desire to the extreme by signing their patients (thus transforming 
them into “products”), Huyler offers a much less drastic means of satisfying the desire to 
“take possession” and “make meaning.”  The chapter details an event in which a patient, 
involved in a motor vehicular accident, is brought in from the trauma room.  He is 
heavily sedated and his blood pressure is dropping.  An x-ray of his chest confirms 
tension pneumothorax, a build-up of air in the chest cavity, caused by a punctured lung.  
This means the patient could die within minutes if swift action is not taken.  Huyler 
provides a very telling description of himself running to grab a needle in order to release 
the air from the patient’s chest cavity: 
I found myself sprinting down the hallway to the ER for a needle and syringe, 
fumbling in a drawer, turning, rushing back as patients and nurses stared at me.  I 
felt like an actor in a melodrama, cutting around people with a needle in hand, 
with me white coat trailing behind me like a cape. (Huyler 50) 
 
It is important to note that in nearly every aspect, all eyes are on him.  His narrative 
expresses that what he is doing is a heroic act of great importance, one worthy of notice 
and deserving of an audience.  With his audience, his work does not run the risk of 
becoming anonymous.  He is “cutting around” people, implying deliberate movements of 
precision as he returns with the life-saving tool— the MacGuffin.  His coat is symbolic of 
a hero’s costume, as a “cape” that “trails behind.”  In this moment, he is an actor playing 
the hero role in the over-dramatized scenes that take place on E.R. (1994-2009) or 
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Chicago Hope (1994-2000), the kind of glorifying scenes that bring envy and admiration 
to doctors and recognition to their actions.  
Returning, he plunges the needle into the patient’s chest.  The air escapes, letting 
out a hiss and “bubbles of bloody froth” (50).  After the air has been released and the 
patient’s blood pressure and heart rate stabilize, he reflects: “I realized that I had saved 
him, that he was alive because of me” (50).  This moment brings with it a profound sense 
of accomplishment and pride that can only come with saving another person's life.  To 
own his accomplishment, to take possession of this achievement and distinguish it, he 
“savors” the very existence of the patient’s well-being: “I knew that he would leave 
whole, and I sat there in the dark for a while, watching the red and blue lights of the 
monitor, savoring him, taking something for myself” (51).  Here Huyler is able to take 
ownership of his work in a way, I would argue, that does not dehumanize the patient or 
disturb his agency.  Knowing that this patient may wake up and go on to never know who 
saved his life, Huyler is there to appreciate the now calm and peaceful space this patient 
inhabits.  
A doctor’s need to create and internalize meaning in his or her work is also 
evident in a chapter titled “A Difference of Opinion,” which describes a situation in 
which a doctor is unable to spend those few moments to “savor” a job well done.  Here, 
an attending physician “consider[s] withdrawing support altogether” from a young man 
suffering from “pneumonia sepsis” (75).  Because the patient is a “young man,” Huyler 
reasons in favor of an “aggressive treatment” to keep him alive (76).  The treatment to 
keep the patient alive and recovering lasts for over a week and serves to “unfailingly rob 
[Huyler] of sleep” to the point that he had “come to dread [the patient]” (76).  The 
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amount and intensity of care that the patient needs have led Huyler to “know him 
intimately” after having “examined him dozens of times, turn[ing] him over to look at his 
back, put[ing] his gloved finger in his mouth, in his rectum, into the interior of his chest 
cavity, and [he] had never once exchanged a single word with [the patient]” (76).  One 
cannot help but notice the repetitious way in which Huyler explains his part in keeping 
this patient’s condition stable.  His language is plain, matter-of-fact in its routine 
tediousness, contrasting against what it might mean to know another human intimately.  
To know another on an intimate level is to know the fears and hopes that drive him or 
her; Huyler only knows this patient in his anatomy as it applies to his care, nothing more. 
Due to the patient’s condition, he is prevented from even engaging in basic, verbal 
communication.  This patient and provider dynamic could be seen as a metaphor for a 
doctor’s inability to have meaningful communication with a patient due to the 
dehumanizing restraint that detached concern places on patients’ agency.  To drive this 
metaphor further, he describes the patient, in his state of “near-death,” as just a “body” 
with only an “animal-self” left to it (76).  By way of detached concern, this excerpt 
echoes the condition in which doctors are asked to view their patients.  In order to avoid 
any threat to objectivity, doctors should not look to know their patients beyond what’s 
Huyler’s gloved finger has experienced.  However, it was Huyler’s use of empathy that 
led to this patient’s survival as Huyler argued for his treatment based on the patient’s 
young age and what life he had yet to experience. 
Six months later, Huyler recognizes a man in a pulmonary clinic waiting room to 
be the patient.  When approached, the patient could only look up from his newspaper, 
“suspiciously,” and ask “Do I know you?” (77).  These are the four words the chapter 
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ends on, adding weight and authority to the lack of recognition for Huyler’s efforts.  With 
everything Huyler gave to keep this patient alive, for all his efforts, the young man has no 
idea that this is the doctor who argued against him being taken off life support.  In this 
moment, the doctor, like LaFavre’s laborer, is unable to “internalize meaning” due to 
anonymity.  However, all is not lost as Huyler is able to construct some recognition for 
his efforts in the writing of his narrative, more so in its publication.  Though the patient 
may never appreciate how close he was to death, the narrative’s audience may take the 
place as witness.   
Dr. Huyler provides two instances within which he recalls his uncomfortable 
struggle to maintain that distant extrinsic self and balance his empathy while performing 
highly invasive procedures.  In both instances, the patients are visibly distressed and there 
is a considerable effort on his part to locate that balance between being emotionally numb 
and being burdened by the emotions of empathy.  In the first example, he is preparing to 
administer a pelvic exam; his shame is palpable as his language suggests that the 
procedure is not so much a medical exam but rather a depraved act: 
You are breezy, conversational.  She’s fifteen years old, and she’s crying, and the 
nurse is holding her hand like a mother, but she’s beautiful anyway, and you feel 
dark, ashamed, you do not like what you see in yourself.  But then you’re inside, 
you open the speculum, and it looks fine, and then you flick in the swabs and 
you’re done.  (Huyler 124) 
 
To put the reader into his level of discomfort, his narrative frames the shame and guilt he 
feels in conducting this routine procedure.  The narrative use of “you” brings the 
examination into an uncomfortably close proximity.  The actions he is taking are now the 
reader’s actions and they are being performed on a crying, young girl.  He attempts to 
hide his emotion with an air of nonchalance but it appears as though he is doing it more 
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for his own reassurance than hers; for, as he states, he sees something unwelcome within 
himself—what we can assume to be a feeling of sexual arousal or interest.  He cannot 
express his empathy for the pain and emotional discomfort his patient is experiencing and 
relies on the presence of the motherly nurse to provide that needed source of empathy, 
that connection, he is unable to provide. 
In another uncomfortable scene, that again involves the specter of sexual 
invasion, a patient, involved in a car collision, is possibly suffering from a ruptured 
spleen.  The procedure, again, is an invasive one, as it requires an examination of the 
patient’s prostate.  Learning of this, the patient cries out for his wife and begs for an 
alternative, due to past traumas: 
“Don’t put it in, don’t put it in, don’t do it.  Mary!  Mary!”  I just nod to the techs, 
and they grab his legs and spread them apart.  “I was abused as a child.  I was 
raped.  You don’t understand.”  I suspected it, and I pause, but it doesn’t matter if 
I understand.   You’re fifty years old and I think you have a ruptured spleen, and 
you’re going to die unless we know.  (Huyler 113) 
 
Although a ruptured spleen is a life-and-death situation, Dr. Huyler does give pause in 
response to his patient’s plea.  He pauses on what this invasive procedure means for this 
patient in relation to his past trauma and his pause invites a world of speculation.  One 
could read Huyler’s hesitation as a question to himself: “Is there another way?” and “Can 
I spare this man any further mental trauma?”  For that pause, one could claim that he 
empathizes with what this man must be going through, but ultimately, it is the patient’s 
life on the line and the procedure must continue.  Although this is a life-and-death 
situation, Huyler allows the patient’s narrative to temporarily overtake his own.  Huyler 
and the techs fall into the background and the patient’s fearful dialogue takes center 
stage.  Even Huyler’s reasoning stays outside of the moment, appearing as an 
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afterthought as indicated by the lack of quotation marks.  One could read this as Huyler 
giving the patient’s narrative its place, even when the given situation would not allow it.   
In both cases, detached concern was seemingly used to fulfill a purpose.  In the 
case of the pelvic exam, it seemed to have helped hide palpable shame and in a life-or-
death situation; it helped to create distance from the pleading cries of the patient.  The 
distance and hindering of emotion was obviously not comfortable for Huyler, as evident 
in his narratives, and it would seem that through giving these patients their moment in his 
writing, he looks to give them the voice detached concern would not allow. 
As long as the current system of healthcare stands, many doctors may feel the 
need to create or salvage meaning and recognition from their work.  It is worth 
considering the possibility that narrative writing allows for a healthy and ethical option 
for the desire to take possession of and find meaning in the product of one’s work while 
maintaining the humanity of one’s patients.  Each heroic or harrowing detail could be 
captured as it happened, accessible for recognition for a wide audience while honoring 
the narratives of patients when constrains will now allow a doctor to do so at the medical 
encounter.  Doctor’s narratives, like Huyler’s, allow an audience to see the very real and 
human elements to medicine that are hidden under the numbing expectations and 
conditioning of Taylor’s principles.     
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NURSES 
 
“Caring isn’t always about holding someone’s hand.  At the end of the 
day, I know I’ve done my job when my patient wants to let go of me.”  
–Laura DeVaney, Becoming a Nurse, pg. 53) 
  
In her narrative, “Becoming a Nurse,” Laura DeVaney describes the profession of 
being a nurse as a balancing act in being able to “walk a fine line […] between saving 
lives and pissing people off” (Gutkind 47).  Much like Marsh’s use of the “tightrope” 
metaphor, balancing is also central to DeVaney’s narrative.  Her job is ultimately about 
“saving lives,” but in the process of saving lives, she cannot be as gentle as her patients 
may prefer.  Although a bit brash, her philosophy echoes one of the qualities Florence 
Nightingale assigns to a good nurse, which is to “be kind and sympathetic, but never 
emotional” (Seymer 352).  As evident throughout DeVaney’s narrative, this balance is a 
compromise that exists within her moral obligation as a nurse, to be “gentle but 
professional” and to “love no patient but care for them all” (Gutkind 47).  Such a clinical 
philosophy seems to exude discipline and regulation of emotions.   This is how DeVaney 
indirectly defines clinical empathy.   
To give further insight into her balancing act of emotional regulation, her 
narrative details the unpleasant task of cleaning fresh tracheal stoma for a patient in a 
post-surgery ward for cancer patients: 
[The patient’s] face is brick red.  His neck veins bulge as thick as rat tails 
when he coughs.  I’m elbow deep in frothy mucus, suctioning his tracheal 
stoma, the permanent breathing hole in his neck.  […]  If his voice box 
hadn’t been surgically removed, yesterday, a slew of profanities would 
escape him.  Instead, he looks at me with eyes that teeter between I hate 
you and Thank you.  (Gutkind 47) 
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It would appear that there is a level of confidence in DeVaney, a belief that she has her 
method of clinical empathy figured out.  Her empathy is regulated, and her philosophy of 
“walking a fine line between saving lives and pissing people off” is mirrored in her 
patient’s mixed response of “hate” and gratitude.  She is caring for him, without the aid 
of love.  Her actions exhibit the emotive, cognitive, and moral components of empathy, 
as she recognizes his discomfort and pain but makes the cognitive decision to maintain a 
professional distance and not share in his suffering.  The moral component expresses an 
altruistic motivation tempered with willpower that results in a “conscious decision to 
“[…] distance oneself from the other’s plight,” thereby avoiding “empathic 
communication” (Morse 275).  She recognizes the discomfort her patient is experiencing 
from the suction tube inside his newly acquired stoma, but for the sake of his health and 
recovery, she makes the conscious decision to dissociate herself from his all-too-visible 
pain.  Through the cognitive component, one that involves the “intellectual ability to 
understand another’s perspective and predict his or her thoughts,” she is certain in her 
understanding of both his gratitude and his intense displeasure all without his verbal 
confirmation.  She reads his physical posturing without feeling the need to resonate or 
mirror and participate in his contagious pain.  To do so would be careless, from her point 
of view, and would jeopardize her ability to properly care for him and aid him in his 
recovery from surgery.   
In order to show how an unregulated emotional response, provoked by empathy, 
creates a conflict with medical practice, DeVaney shares the experience of teaching her 
patient’s wife how to suction the tracheal stoma.  The wife, lacking the cognitive skill to 
recognize and distance herself from the experience of the emotive component, exhibits a 
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strong affective, or engaged, response to her husband’s pain and discomfort: “[h]er face 
scrunches up, on the brink of tears.  She’s never felt so vulnerable.  She’s never felt so 
helpless” (Gutkind 49).  Able to recognize and read the wife’s emotional response, 
DeVaney observes that she “would have hugged her” had she been “fresh out of nursing 
school” (Gutkind 47).  DeVaney sees the wife’s inability to continue the procedure as 
further proof that her own method is the right one and works to help get her past that 
emotive point with an education in “tough love.”  However, while suctioning out the 
mucus, the wife “commits the cardinal sin” of looking into her husband’s face and seeing 
it “contorted in pain” (Gutkind 49).  Once she sees the pain she is causing to her husband, 
the wife is unable to continue the medical procedure.  This is the result of giving in to the 
emotional response of engaged empathy.  She shares in his pain and cannot bear to 
continue the procedure.  Without the developed skill of clinical empathy, the wife is left 
defenseless to the contagious effects of empathy, which flood her with emotion; as a 
result, she is unable to do what is necessary to help her husband.   
The juxtaposing of these two instances of the same procedure for the same patient 
serves as evidence of the usefulness of DeVaney’s “tough love” method and further 
establishes the credibility of not only her claims that a nurse “walks a fine line,” one that 
requires the utmost ability to balance one’s emotions, but also Nightingale’s “qualities” 
of a “good nurse.”  For DeVaney, a nurse does not show compassion with love but with 
medical attention and care.  This is how she regulates her empathy, by acknowledging 
and suppressing the emotional pull of the emotive and focusing on the cognitive: she is 
able to understand the discomfort of her patients and she chooses not to engage in it.  
Rather, she acknowledges it along with her social responsibility to maintain a clinical 
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distance.  Her emotive response is not fully ignored, as she is able to recognize that some 
form of a connection does still exist with the patient.  She is able to read his reaction of “I 
hate you” and “Thank you”—and to read his wife’s emotions as well.  If the objective of 
clinical empathy is to balance one’s own empathy while still being able to provide some 
form of emotional connection to the patient, then wouldn’t this patient’s mixed resonance 
be a mirrored response of DeVaney’s “tough love?” 
Much like the other narratives of nurses to be considered in this chapter, 
DeVaney's reflective accounts provide insight into the contagiousness of the empathic 
process.  It is not simply enough to see how her own process of regulation and distancing 
is working, but why it is working.  She establishes early on the reality of clinical empathy 
as a “fine line” between care and distance, a form of “tough love.”  Furthermore, she 
relates the experience of the wife's inability to walk that same line as evidence of her 
giving in to affective empathy which, in turn, caused empathic distress.  It is through 
these narratives that one can observe the regulation of empathy, and learn, through 
metaphors and reflection, the different methods of clinical empathy. 
DeVaney later shows that she is by no means completely immune to the 
contagiousness of the emotive component and can be overcome with sympathy.  She 
details an instance in which her emotional defenses are compromised and for a moment, 
no matter how brief, emotion takes hold of her.  The event takes place in the next room, 
where another cancer patient is waiting for the same procedure.  Interestingly enough, 
when her defenses come down and the plight of a patient becomes real for her, the event 
of realization has the markings of someone who is experiencing early symptoms of some 
contagious virus or bug: 
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All the things to which I’m conditioned to be numb jump out at me.  My 
neck flashes with heat.  For three fleeting heartbeats of a moment, I think I 
might cry.  I pity Roger, yes but equal to that—or perhaps more so—I fear 
becoming him.  (Gutkind 52) 
 
The fear of this connection is palpable.  The fact that she measures the moment of 
emotional connection in her own heartbeats is revealing.  The almost cliché presence of 
her heart, leading to the overwhelming feeling she might cry, represents a breach in her 
emotional immunity.  Her neck going flush, complete with the other physical signals, 
could easily be those early indicators of a disease in its first stages of development, much 
like that first, big sneeze that, like a light switch being flicked on, heralds of an oncoming 
cold or that sudden spike of nausea felt in the esophagus that serves as a warning of the 
emesis.  Her empathic response has led her to emotionally take his place as her cognitive 
safeguard fails her.  This, one might observe, is what she means by her fear of “becoming 
him.” 
DeVaney has unintentionally broken her own rule and has engaged in the emotive 
component, allowing her to “perceive and share in another’s psychological state” (Morse 
275).  What stands out the most is how her observation of the event ends: “I fear 
becoming him.”  She is alarmed at what her pity may lead to—someone open and 
vulnerable to suffering.  The notion of sacrificing her autonomy, to share in his suffering 
as if it were her own, is so frightening for her.  That could be an indication of how much 
she prides herself on her individualistic ability to regulate her empathy.  For nurses like 
DeVaney, this is a matter of autonomy.  If she were to lose the elements that which make 
her an individual in this clinical setting, by giving into the inherent humanistic quality of 
the emotive component of empathy and identifying with another in emotional distress, 
she will lose her professionalism and ability to provide proper care. 
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One of the first points to be taken from DeVaney’s narrative is that empathy is 
contagious.  It is a powerful form of emotional identification that has developed over the 
course of our evolution.18  Evident from her fearful reaction to empathizing with her 
patient, emotions, like empathy, can be understood as “contagious” through a “process in 
which a person or group influences the behavior of another person or group through the 
conscious or unconscious induction of emotional states and behavioral attitude” 
(Schoenewolf).  Although her narrative would lead readers to understand that neither she 
nor anyone close to her is suffering from cancer, her emotional connection to her patient, 
Roger, leads her to fear being affected by the disease as he is.  Through what can be seen 
as a contagious spread of emotion, she finds herself influenced by his current state.  Like 
the germs of common illnesses and infections or certain communicable diseases, 
emotions can spread from person to person, with one person, a patient zero, so to speak, 
having the capacity to change the mood of an entire group of people. 
To understand how an individual might take on the emotions of another, by way 
of that contagion, consider Sigmund Freud's analysis of Gustave Le Bon's observations 
on “collective mind” in chapter two of Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego 
(1922).  The term “collective mind” is a way of defining the phenomenon of when an 
individual, within a group, begins to “feel, think, and act in a manner quite different” 
from how he or she would “in a state of isolation” (Freud).  For Freud, via Le Bon, a 
group of individuals—defined as a collective with “heterogeneous elements”—combines, 
even if just for a moment, like the “cells which constitute a living body” (Freud).  
                                                 
18 See Adam Smith’s “Cognitive Empathy and Emotional Empathy in Human Behavior 
and Evolution,” Psychological Record, Vol. 56, pages 3-21, 2006. 
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Through this combination, those heterogeneous elements become “obliterated in a group” 
and thus the group becomes homogeneous as the “distinctiveness” of the individual 
“vanishes” (Freud).  Through the contagious pull of the collective mind, an individual 
sheds his or her individualistic traits or mood to become a part of an emotionally 
cohesive collective.  
In the absence of an explanation from Le Bon, Freud goes on to speculate that 
there must be a “bond” that allows the “individuals in the group” to “combine into a 
unity” (Freud).  In the case of medicine, I would speculate that this unconscious bond that 
unites individuals would be the empathy felt for the suffering of another.  The contagious, 
empathic response, triggered in the caregiver by the suffering of a patient, is what could 
take the individual and bring him or her into the collective mind.  Examples of this 
phenomenon can be observed in DeVaney’s narrative in the wife’s unregulated response 
to her husband’s pain and in DeVaney’s “fear of becoming” her patient.  Empathy, is not 
only contagious but has the potential to threaten the autonomy of anyone who “catches” 
it.   
One of the causes given for this drive for a collective mind is “contagion.”  
Within the setting of a group, “every sentiment and act is contagious,” Freud reasons, 
“and contagious to such a degree that an individual readily sacrifices his [or her] personal 
interest to the collective interest” (Freud).19  The use of the word “sacrifice” brings to 
mind the connection empathy has with an altruistic or prosocial behavior.  It could be 
seen as altruistic to want to cast off one's own personal interest for the sake of another 
who is visibly suffering.  Appropriately, Freud observes that “[c]ontagion is a 
                                                 
19 Emphasis mine. 
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phenomenon of which it is easy to establish the presence, but that it is not easy to 
explain” (Freud).  What could be observed from Le Bon and Freud’s ideas is that, in an 
effort to regulate empathy, nurses like DeVaney are fighting against an unconscious 
desire to sacrifice emotional autonomy for the sake of being a part of a collective, a group 
mind. 
To bring a medical perspective on empathy into the discussion of contagion, I 
refer back to Morse's four components of empathy, discussed in Exploring Empathy: A 
Conceptual Fit for Nursing Practice?  The contagious characteristic of empathy can be 
observed as the emotive component, which allows the ability to “subjectively perceive 
and share another person’s psychological state or intrinsic feelings” (Morse 275).  Rooted 
in the vernacular understanding of empathy as the “ability to understand and share the 
feelings of another” (OED), empathy in its emotive form is widely viewed as an inherent 
human quality, one that is seen as a “response” that is “vicariously aroused in an 
individual when he or she perceives emotional distress within another” (Morse 275).  The 
emotive component is where that perspective taking20 is enabled, which allows for that 
“homogeneous” unity. 
Within medicine, the emotive component, if left unregulated, can lead to a state 
known as “engaged empathy,” which involves the “experiencing of emotions in parallel 
with each patient” (Halpern 671).  As observed by the theory of collective mind, the act 
of engaged empathy – at its extreme – would involve a repeated dissolving of autonomy 
to join in unity with the suffering of each and every patient.  To engage in that strong of 
                                                 
20 As defined by C. Daniel Batson, Shannon Early, and Giovanni Salvarani, perspective 
taking can be defines in two ways: 1) imagining how someone feels in a given situation 
2) imaging how you might feel in that same situation. 
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an emotional response with a patient would be to “sacrifice” oneself.  Because the proper 
use of clinical empathy requires various degrees of cognitive distancing, such a deep 
connection and involvement with “each patient” would be incredibly taxing, or as 
Halpern puts it, “absurdly demanding,” and would put a caregiver on the fast track to 
compassion fatigue and burnout (671).    
Many of the narratives of nurses present the emotive component of empathy as 
something to build a resistance against, due to its contagious nature.  This resistance, or 
emotional “immune system,” is built and fortified in order to avoid engaged empathy or a 
collective mind and the subsequent burnout or compassion fatigue.  I have observed that 
this building of “resistance” is a strategy of empathy regulation most commonly 
expressed in the narratives of nurses.  The building and then strengthening of an 
emotional immune system, presented in these narratives, is often framed as a moral 
obligation.  This could be because such emotional involvement and sacrifice would be 
incredibly draining and thus lead to a compromised ability to perform one's job, evident 
in the case of the wife being unable to suction out her husband’s airway.  Thus, it would 
be a moral obligation, to the patient and the caregiver's ability to perform his or her job 
properly, to establish that distance and create those barriers.    
It is not clear why the framework of the emotional immune system is a concern 
primarily within the narratives of nurses, specifically, but it may be related to how much 
time nurses spend with patients compared to the average time doctors, paramedics, and 
other providers spend with patients, all the while performing an array of intimate 
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procedures involving hygiene, mobility, and comfort (both emotional and physical).21  
Such a level of exposure would promote a heavy risk in becoming emotionally engaged 
with patients and share in their suffering.  Observed in medical narratives, in the world of 
nursing, neglecting to protect oneself from becoming “engaged” is often seen as a failure, 
often a moral shortcoming. 
The notion that one has the moral obligation to be on guard against the contagious 
component of empathy and avoid sacrificing oneself to the collective suffering of patients 
could possibly find root in the principles of early bacteriology and germ theory.  To 
examine the clinical notion of an emotional contagion and the responsibility to regulate 
exposure, it would be helpful to introduce the theme from which public-health campaigns 
of the early 20th century were developed.  These campaigns, formed largely in part by 
John W. Ritchie and highlighted by his Primer of Sanitation (1913), were introduced as a 
call to arms for the “never-ceasing war” that wages between “bodies and disease” 
(Ritchie 11).  As such, any illness resulting from a poor immune system was seen to be 
the result of an individual’s “carelessness” (Ritchie 191).  Yes, people became ill, but it 
was the responsibility of the individual to ensure that the disease did not spread.  Such 
emphasis was placed on the “social responsibility” of the individual to ensure the public’s 
well-being that carelessness was seen as “the ultimate sin” (Walde 73).  Thus, various 
“strategies of health management” emerged from further advancement in germ theory 
and bacteriology (Walde 73).   
                                                 
21 See Nursing Times’ article “How much time do nurses spend on patient care?” August 
14th 2013. https://www.nursingtimes.net/Journals/2013/08/09/h/h/q/140813-How-much-
time-do-nurses-spend-on-patient-care.pdf 
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To put into perspective the danger of engaged empathy, rather than illness, the 
contagious component of empathy can be substituted for germs in this “never-ceasing-
war” and the use of cognitive distancing for “strategy of health management.”  
Additionally, in illness and disease, people suffer, and it could be said that the suffering 
should end with the care of the nurse, rather than spread to the nurse, causing the spread 
or contagious unity.  From this view of disease theory, an adequate framework can be 
constructed for understanding the emotive component as a contagious disease, as it is 
portrayed in the narratives of nurses.  It is in these narratives that shared emotion is the 
illness contracted by time spent performing procedures that put the nurse within close 
physical and emotional proximity of suffering.  After all, what is the skill of clinical 
empathy but the implementation of that social responsibility, applied to the practice of 
medicine.  Nurses are given the self-regulatory responsibility to avoid engaging in the 
“vicariously aroused response” that is the contagiousness of the collective mind.  Rather, 
they are encouraged to distance themselves and use other components of empathy, such 
as the cognitive and behavioral components, to convey their understanding of a patient's 
suffering and respond appropriately.   
Expressed in the narratives to come, to forget one’s “social responsibility” and 
fully share in a patient’s emotional distress is seen as a moral failing of “carelessness,” 
one that can lead not only to the inability to focus and provide adequate care but also to 
burnout.  Therefore, by adopting the individualistic responsibilities found in germ theory, 
empathy regulation becomes a “social responsibility” for nurses in order to avoid the 
contagious effects of emotion and free up cognitive abilities.  Like the strategies of health 
management, the strategies of empathy regulation are an individualistic endeavor and 
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therefore would vary from person to person.  However, the expectation of emotional self-
regulation places a heavy burden on an already overly-burdened profession and its 
individual practitioners.   
The skill of clinical empathy is, as mentioned earlier, not a science and its 
methods can vary greatly from person to person and from patient to patient.  It takes a 
great deal of conditioning to be able to distance oneself and like any skill, clinical 
empathy is not mastered overnight.  Much like DeVaney’s narrative, the following 
narratives provide self-reflective examples of the social responsibility to build and 
strengthen an emotional immune system.  Furthermore, the narratives provide very 
different strategies involving not only the care of the patients encountered, but also the 
nurses' own method of distancing from their own emotions. 
Trauma Junkie: Memoirs of an Emergency Flight Nurse (2001) is a collection of 
reflective experiences from Janice Hudson, a flight nurse with California’s 
Shock/Trauma Air Rescue (CALSTAR).  During a stress debriefing class, aimed at 
helping medical professionals, it was suggested that Hudson keep a journal in order to 
“cope with the awful spectacles” she would eventually witness (Hudson 5).  It is worth 
noting that this advice, given in 1990, would coincide with narrative medicine’s rise in 
the late 20th century and serves to highlight the usefulness of narrative writing for 
medical providers.  Her published memoirs are the product of that journal.  The very title 
itself, “Trauma Junkie,” exemplifies the enthusiastic drive a flight nurse would possess in 
order to work outside the confines of a hospital ward, an ambitious desire to be at the 
forefront of medical care.  Therefore, Hudson has had to condition herself differently, 
having to fly on scene at a “breakneck pace” to care for “critical trauma patients” 
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(Hudson 6).  As a flight nurse, her work blurs the line between nurse and paramedic, 
setting her perspective apart from the others in terms of what it means for a nurse to 
regulate empathy.  Her narrative has been selected for this study to examine empathy 
regulation from a nursing perspective outside of the controlled environment of the 
hospital.   
Hudson is able to provide observations of her own methods of empathy 
regulation; additionally, she is able to examine them in relation to the strategies of her 
colleagues.  This ability allows for a deeper understanding of her own strategies.  For 
instance, Hudson is able to see the seemingly harmonious implementation of clinical 
empathy by Rose, a fellow flight nurse.  She sees within Rose a humanistic method that 
seems to be without distancing and admits to the envy she feels for that ability to have a 
deeper connection to patients: 
Rose always maintains a calm exterior.  She is also acutely aware of the 
human side of our care, reminding us these are not simply bodies we are 
salvaging, but human beings with lives and families.  Her perspective 
calms patients, families, and co-workers, and I often wish I could emulate 
her style.  Unfortunately, if I allow myself to consider the personal lives of 
my patients, I can’t concentrate on the work at hand.  It becomes too 
painful.  (Hudson 159-160) 
 
Rose personifies what seems to be the perfect balance of professionalism and empathy.  
Hudson is aware of the humanistic quality of Rose’s work, apparent in her ability to see 
patients as more than anatomy.  To see the patients as human and to see the connection 
they have to their families is a form of respect that comes with a humanistic approach.  
The description of Rose’s ability to be “acutely aware” shows an understanding of the 
behavioral component of empathy, the “communicative response” to “convey 
understanding” of a patient’s “perspective” (Morse 274).  Beyond being able to 
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understand that these patients are “not simply bodies,” the use of the behavioral 
component allows for the “ability to communicate” that “empathic understanding” 
(Morse 275).     
Hudson’s narrative observations of Rose could be personified in what Priti 
Lakhani, a healthcare executive and physician, believes to be the ultimate meaning 
behind empathy in medicine: “being respectful” (Lakhani).  She treats her patients and 
their families with a respect that humanizes them and, through that connection, is able to 
give reassurance to those around her.  Additionally, what Hudson can see in Rose is a 
balance, as evident by her “calm exterior.”  To view a shock or trauma patient, in a state 
of near-death, as someone with a family and aspirations, and not just a list of symptoms, 
complications, and injuries, without breaking down, is no small feat.  Hudson, through 
her experience, knows this.  She “wishes” to have that same emotive connection Rose 
exhibits, but she perceives that empathic balance to be personally unobtainable.  Unable 
to let down her emotional defenses and “consider the personal lives of [her] patients,” she 
makes an individualistic, cognitive choice to shut out any emotive response she might 
feel.  At first glance, this level of distancing may appear insensitive; however, Hudson 
has had to build her immune system differently from most nurses due to her job: as a 
flight nurse, her patients may often be on the brink of death and she feels that she cannot 
risk her ability to “concentrate” on the task at hand.  Like in DeVaney’s example of fear, 
to dissolve her autonomy and catch the suffering of one of her patients could seriously 
compromise her ability to save a life.   
Readers can observe Hudson reflecting on her own strategy, which she classes as 
a perceived inability to be more empathic with patients after she witnesses other 
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emergency personnel (firefighters, paramedics, and police) react callously to the victim 
of a drug deal gone bad.  The first responders have built up their own emotional immune 
systems; observing their reaction to a shooting victim, she recognizes the same level of 
distancing in herself: 
Our patient died later that night. He was found to be HIV-positive, 
decisively precluding him from organ donation.  The shooting turned out 
to be over a quarter gram of crack.  This man was someone’s son, brother, 
husband, friend.  And yet I found myself surprisingly unmoved.  I simply 
found the whole incident a stupid waste of life.  I guess I’ve built a bit of 
an emotional bunker for myself.  (Hudson 46-47) 
 
For Hudson, had she allowed herself to lower her immune system’s defenses and 
participate in the emotive component to be “moved” by the death of the young man, and 
every patient like him, she feels as though she might succumb to burnout or be unable to 
“concentrate” on her job.  If she were to allow herself to “consider this patient’s life,” she 
might dwell on the regrettable path that led this young man to his premature death.  
Instead, to a great deal, she cognitively distances herself from the patient and looks at 
him, as he is now, a “waste” of potential.  She understands and recognizes the distress 
that this loss of life creates, prompting a cognitive response either to engage or to 
distance herself.  As part of her perceived “social responsibility” and to avoid the 
contagious effects of empathy, she chooses the latter and distances herself from the 
distress of another.  One might observe her use of the word “bunker,” rather than 
“barrier” or simply referring to her regulation as distant.  The militaristic sense of the 
word bunker would lead readers to note the authority it brings with it and recognize how 
strong her emotional immune system needs to be.  For the sake of survivability, she has 
fortified herself behind hardened walls, much like the other first responders.  However, 
perhaps because she is readily able to identify her own defenses, she sees herself as 
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capable of some form of behavioral or emotive responses that would display a 
sympathetic quality.  After all, she refers to her “bunker” as incomplete, partial, or maybe 
just situational, as evident by the word “bit.”  It maybe she only hides behind a few 
fortified walls.  She has not committed herself to a psychic numbing.22  She shows the 
presence and possible emergence of compassion still in her.  She is not suffering from 
burnout.  The immunity she has built up has kept her at an emotional distance from which 
she feels relatively comfortable and safe enough to do her job. 
Much like Hudson's insightful ability to explore the strategies of her empathy 
regulation through narrative, the following narrative presents the same level of insightful 
awareness; however, it does so from a different environment: the emergency room and 
hospice care.  This narrative, like DeVaney’s, was selected from a collection titled I 
Wasn’t Strong Like This When I Started Out: True Stories of Becoming a Nurse (2013).  
Making the claim that nurses represent the “backbone of the healthcare system,” the 
collection features mindful accounts of nurses working through “all stages of their 
careers” while highlighting the “requirements” of being a nurse: “empathy, fortitude, 
                                                 
22 While observing the other first responders and what would seem to be their 
insensitivity to tragedy, Hudson explains that “they witnessed man’s inhumanity to man 
over and over, day after day.  In order to cope with this brutality, they learned to build a 
thick insulating shell around themselves.  Even the most macho of men must go home 
and cry alone in a closet after they’ve seen a murdered toddler or heard a burn victim 
screaming in agony.  Building an enormous emotional bunker is the only way they can 
survive” (Hudson 46).  In order to “cope” with the trauma of being a first responder in a 
large city, these individuals have had to work with a degree of “psychic numbing” akin to 
what Robert Jay Lifton observed in rescue workers in Hiroshima after the atomic bomb 
dropped.  The mantra of psychic numbing is “[n]umb yourselves some more, don't feel; 
above all, don't question” (Lifton 620).  See Lifton's “Beyond Psychic Numbing: A Call 
to Awareness,” American Orthopsychiatric Association, Inc. 1982. 
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knowledge, and grace” (Gutkind).23  The two narratives chosen are examples of the 
book’s claim.   
Not all nurses are as comfortable with the notion of emotional distancing and 
becoming “numb” to the bonds of empathy and strengthening their immune system, as 
observed in the previous two examples.  Some nurses still fight to hold on to that 
connection created by the emotive component and remain emotionally engaged to 
patients for various reasons.  Kimberly Condon, a fourteen-year veteran of emergency 
medicine at the time of her narrative, examines her struggle with empathy regulation in 
her essay “Approaching Death.”  She describes herself as “overly sensitive” and, 
providing an excellent example of the moral component, chose nursing because she 
appreciated the feeling of being someone that people could “lean on in times of crisis” 
(Gutkind 244-245).  Her rationale for becoming a nurse is the result of a strong moral 
component to her personality.  A “prerequisite for humanistic relationships,” the moral 
component has guided her to healthcare as a deliberate process to “reach out to help 
people” (Morse 274).  Her moral empathy is quite strong, as the “suffering of others” has 
always provoked a response in her (Gutkind 244).  Additionally, her emotive component 
is highly developed and using it aided her, making her a nurse “who had a gift” for taking 
on the emotional state of another, for “sensing what a psychotic patient needed in order to 
                                                 
23 The outward, public “image” of nursing and its psychological impact on nurses is a 
topic that has been given a considerable amount of attention.  According to a study 
conducted by Miyuki Takase (Influence of Public Image of Nurses on Nursing Practice, 
2000) nurses not only struggle with a deprived levels of autonomy due to their but also 
struggle with obstacles, “not from within the profession but from their stereotypical 
occupational image.”  For more on this subject, see Collins and Henderson’s Autonomy: 
Part of the Nursing Role?, 1991 and Buscherhof and Seymour’s On my own terms: the 
Redefinition of Success in Nursing, 1990.   
54 
 
de-escalate”; she was the “one to call when a battered woman needed to feel safe enough 
to talk” (Gutkind 244).  She seemed to pride herself on her ability to dissolve her 
autonomy and share in the contagious suffering of patients.  Now, after years of working 
in the ER, she considers herself regrettably callous and remembers how she was when 
she first started: “ma[king] it a point to touch every patient, even when she wasn’t 
examining them” (Gutkind 244).  There is a deep sadness and longing in her words as her 
narrative looks back on how she has changed.  In contrast, DeVaney looks back on how 
she might have hugged her patient’s wife if she were just out of nursing school; Condon, 
on the other hand, does not want to let that empathic connection go.  The emotional 
distance she has had to develop is described as her “edges [beginning] to wither,” as she 
feels a “hardness creeping in” (Gutkind 244).  Such imagery might bring to mind the 
death or dying of something.  She seems to view her empathy as if it were being 
suffocated or deprived of the chance to grow and flourish, much like a plant’s leaves that 
begin to wither and brown before drying up into husks.  This hardening of emotions 
might lead readers to believe that her empathy is diminishing, if not being completely 
scarred over by compassion fatigue, but it could very well be that this is just her learning 
to create cognitive distance between herself and her patients, something she is not 
comfortable with.  This “callous” numbing is described in the introduction as a “simple 
strategy” of “[b]uild walls and stay busy” (Gutkind 243).  But is it simple?  Such a coping 
process for an already emotionally driven and empathic individual may feel foreign and 
saddening.  After years of “building walls,” she becomes aware of the foreign and 
uncanny feeling this emotional distancing has created for her: she observes that she “felt 
like [she] was floating through someone else’s life,” she “felt like a fraud” (Gutkind 245).  
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What stands out most about her reflection here is that she feels like “someone else” and a 
“fraud” by not sharing in her patient’s experiences and giving into the contagious pull of 
the group mind.  Rather, by not dissolving her autonomy she feels like a stranger in her 
own body.   
The amount of regret she expresses for being unable to create that emotional 
engagement with patients shows that her capacity for empathy is still very strong.  There 
is something very troubling about her narrative experiences with empathy regulation.  
Her narrative seems to give no evidence of any sort of regulation when she was 
“deescalating” patients and making abuse victims feel “safe.”  If one is to understand that 
empathy needs to be regulated in order to work within medicine, what could be said 
about a nurse who is strongly empathic and could use an unregulated emotive component 
effectively within her job?  Condon’s narrative seems to suggest that her empathy, 
unregulated, and her immune system’s walls unbuilt, served her and her patients far 
better than if she had built defenses and created distance.   
After leaving the ER to work in hospice, she worked with a family and their six-
week old baby.  The baby died and her reaction still exhibits a strong foundation of the 
emotive component as she takes on the suffering as if it were her own child: 
I felt myself losing control, choking and sobbing as if her were my child, 
my loss.  I didn’t even have children.  I tried not to make noise, tried not to 
trespass on their moment.  I was so ashamed!  I was supposed to be their 
support, their rock.  […]  I couldn’t believe what a failure I was.  (Gutkind 
248) 
 
Here, what can be observed is an example of engaged empathy at work.  By reacting as if 
it were her child, Condon is engaged in that instinctive emotive component that is seen by 
many as a “careless” breach of “social responsibility,” and she harshly labels herself 
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based on this “moral failure.”  What is important to note is that she begins by stating that 
she “lost control,” giving into the contagion and acknowledging that even though it feels 
awful and callous, distance is a form of restraint and discipline.  It is difficult to say 
whether anyone who is this strongly empathic could comfortably mold themselves to the 
expectations of clinical empathy and still feel comfortable and confident working with 
patients.  She sees the process of building an emotional immune system in terms of 
property and structures, much like Hudson’s bunker.  By sharing in this tragedy, she has 
broken down the “walls” she has “built” and has entered into their “moment,” a 
movement she views as “trespassing,” something to be “ashamed” about.  Through her 
years in the ER she has come to view emotions as things that should have clearly defined 
borders and fences to keep them separate between individuals, something not to be 
shared.  Much like an illness that needs to stop at the individual by way of a social 
responsibility, Condon still uses a hyperindividualistic lens through which to view 
emotions in medicine in combination with the “social responsibility” to not share in 
emotional experiences, which would result in the “cardinal sin” mentioned. 
Feeling its effects and wanting to avoid the result, Condon leaves emergency 
medicine for a job in hospice to avoid burnout.24  It is there that this unfortunate narrative 
of the child’s death comes from.  She looks back on that event and she describes her 
actions as being “absolutely present” for the parents and their dying child (Gutkind 249).  
                                                 
24 One might reasonably see why hospice might have seemed like the best switch as 
Condon expresses her disdain for the fast-paced and impersonal world of the emergency 
room, but according to recent studies, hospice workers experience a great amount of 
burnout and grief (though not as much as those who work in the ER) due to the deep 
connections and relationships made between patient and caregiver.  See N. Sardiwalla's 
“The Role of Stressors and Coping Strategies in the Burnout Experienced by Hospice 
Workers,” Cancer Nursing, December 2007. 
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She arrives there as a trained and qualified medical professional and is there for them, 
physically, in the room, and beyond that, her use of the emotive component of empathy 
allows her to be present in a way that not many nurses may have felt comfortable.  She is 
present with them by sharing in an “agonizing and priceless” moment, by an emotional 
means made possible through a contagious bond, developed through years of evolution 
and human development.  Through it all, she recognizes the imperfection of being 
engaged by saying: “It was the best I could do” (Gutkind 249). 
Empathy as a contagion, an emotional virus that spreads from host to host, is a 
common drive behind regulating the empathic response within many accounts of nursing.  
The concern lies in engaging in affective contagion; it is feared that a nurse would be 
overcome with empathic distress and thereby unable to properly care for patients.  
Therefore, it seems to be common practice to “build walls,” “bunker” down, or make 
oneself “numb” to the emotional responses that come with witnessing another in a state 
of suffering.  Metaphors seen in the narratives examined, such as the practice of clinical 
empathy being a tightrope or fine line and distancing being an immune system or housing 
structure, provide information that will likely be understood by the general public.25  
Such metaphors can make very complex subjects, such as empathy and burnout, 
accessible to a general readership.   
The narratives in this chapter provide familiar metaphors to facilitate mental 
images of abstract concepts.  Contagions and immune systems are all readily accessible 
                                                 
25 Kathryn Singh, in her essay “Metaphor as a tool in educational leadership classrooms” 
(2010), explores the educational benefits of metaphors as part of a strategy to bring 
abstract concepts to a “concrete representation” for audiences to compare to something 
“familiar.” 
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representations that can help foster understanding of complex subjects such as empathy 
and the process of regulating it.  In order to convey how difficult and distressing it can be 
to regulate empathy, Condon describes her cognitive distancing as a “hardness creeping 
in” as her “edges began to wither.”  Emotional distancing is not an easy task for 
everyone, and it would be helpful to understand the distress it could cause.  Hudson, a 
nurse working in a high-stress, fast-paced environment, felt that she needed to be more 
conservative with her empathy and fortified herself in a “bunker,” a far more drastic 
means of immunity than building “walls.”  Walls are not enough on the warfront.  
DeVaney, though confident in her ability to use her cognitive distancing while still able 
to place herself in her patients’ perspectives, shared a moment when her immune system 
was compromised and “[a]ll the things to which [she was] conditioned to be numb 
jump[ed] out at [her].”  The conveyed breach of emotion provided insight into how even 
a second of affective empathy could prevent a nurse from functioning in his or her 
distress.  It is with an examination of these narratives, in addition to the numerous others 
in and out of print, that greater understanding could be brought to the practice of clinical 
empathy.   
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